The need for high-performance, productive and dependable industrial systems guided engineers to design complex operational architectures. Many features and subsystems are added to the process to produce a fault-tolerant system. All of these subsystems will interact with each other to improve the whole system's performances. Each feature/component has its own dynamic and performances, and the interactions between them may induce a difficulty to control and evaluate the system's behavior. This article proposes the use of an integrated modeling approach for fault-tolerant systems based on stochastic activity networks. It shows how to use this approach to evaluate some system's performance parameters such as the reliability, availability and maintenance cost.
Introduction
There are two major complementary approaches to design performing and dependable industrial systems:
Off-line approaches: During the design stage, the dependability factors-reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS)-are computed using various analysis tools and methods. This allows the implementation of material architectures that meet the RAMS requirements. Online approaches: Some subsystems that insure key functions such as monitoring, fault detection and isolation (FDI), system reconfiguration and maintenance are used to enhance the system's behavior when faults/failures occur. The obtained system is called fault-tolerant (FT) system.
Usually, these two studies are conducted separately. Yet, it is clear that each one is tightly connected to the other and influenced by it, and both have an impact on the obtained results. In FT systems, many subsystems coexist, such as the diagnosis element and backup and control components. The diagnosis system seeks to detect and localize the system's faults as soon as possible to avoid human and/or material damages or performance degradation. In FT systems, diagnosing faults allows some recovering actions such as reconfiguration and maintenance. Material reconfiguration is employed if backup components/systems are used, by switching the system or some of its components to its/their backup(s). In the case of FT control, the diagnosis procedure allows the system to switch from one control law to another according to the new system's architecture. 1 Maintenance actions can also be undertaken to repair the components for which faults have been diagnosed. All these functions and subsystems interact with each other to improve the dependability of the resulting FT system. Nevertheless, they are not totally reliable, and therefore, their performances should be taken into account when assessing the dependability of the FT system. Indeed, the dependability analysis of the modern complex systems requires an integrated approach in which the hardware, software, deterministic elements and stochastic elements are treated in a combined frame which accounts for their dynamic interdependence in the complex related tasks of system production, maintenance and emergency management. 2 For example, consider the diagnosis procedure; it is based on some tuning parameters such as the threshold which has an important impact on the quality of the detection and thus an impact on the actions needed to recover from faults/failures such as reconfiguration and maintenance. Consequently, the diagnosis performances should be considered explicitly when making the dependability study and planning the maintenance activity. 2, 3 In Maza, 4 an integrated modeling approach for the simulation and analysis of FT systems based on stochastic activity networks (SANs) is proposed. This modeling approach is completed and extended in this article to cover other performance amounts' computation such as the system's reliability and maintenance costs. The article is organized as follows.
Section ''Paper's position'' reviews some articles related to this topic, and it sets the position of this work among others. Section ''The SAN formalism'' presents the SANs and their features. Section ''FT systems'' is devoted to the description of FT systems. The SANbased integrated modeling approach is explained on an example of an automated thermal process in section ''SAN-based modeling for performance analysis of an FT system.'' The results of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations coupled with the previous approach are presented in section ''Simulation study and results,'' where some performance amounts are studied for various diagnosis parameters, maintenance and reconfiguration policies. Finally, section ''Conclusion'' concludes the article.
Paper's position
As explained in the ''Introduction'' section, FT systems employ complex operational and material architectures where subsystems, functions and actions interact with each other to tolerate faults and reduce their impact on the system's behavior and dependability. Each added feature, such as diagnosis and backup components, has its own dynamic, reliability and performances (e.g. response time and fault detection rate), which may impact the decision making and the whole system's dependability factors.
Thus, it appears that an integrated modeling and analysis approach is more suitable to deal with FT systems and their heterogeneity. This implies the need of a powerful modeling formalism that can cover, on one hand, the modeling of deterministic dynamical systems/ functions, such as the control and diagnosis, as well as dynamic behaviors, such as reconfiguration. On the other hand, this formalism must allow the modeling of probabilistic phenomena such as fault/failure occurrence to make a dependability analysis. It is important to note that fault recovery actions such as the reconfiguration and maintenance may make changes in the system's structure. These changes in turn will affect the system's reliability evaluation model. The introduction of such functionalities to tolerate faults sets the problem of dynamic reliability assessment. Indeed, the concept of dynamic reliability aims to take into account the interactions between the dynamic and functional behaviors of a system (deterministic behavior), with its dysfunctional one (stochastic behavior). 5 For example, it covers the study of systems for which the reliability model will change with time. Some of these changes are due to random events such as the cold redundancy component switching on when the main component fails or when some physical continuous variables cross some thresholds resulting in operational mode changes. 6, 7 To cope with these issues and system's increasing complexity, dynamic reliability methodologies are being advocated in an attempt to integrate dynamic and stochastic processes, hardware and software components when analyzing the system's dependability. This allows capturing the integrated dynamic response of the whole system. 2, 7 The problem of dynamic reliability makes sense for FT systems because of their complex behavior due to the interaction between many system's features as explained before. The traditional reliability analysis approaches cannot be applied effectively to solve these problems since they assume time-invariant structure. Because of the heterogeneity and complexity of FT systems, analytical models are generally not able to model all these behaviors and the interactions between them. 7 Indeed, diagnosis and control features, for example, affect the system's behavior and structure of FT systems and are theoretically added to improve the system's performances and dependability. However, dependability and diagnosis/automatic studies are usually conducted in separate ways. For example, in control engineering, diagnosis and FT procedures are implemented to tolerate faults and enhance system's safety or availability. But such studies frequently ignore the following question: Is the system's dependability really improved? If yes, by how much?
In the last few years, scientists and engineers became more interested in information and models from both fields and considered them to make a more complete analysis of FT systems. 2, 3 For example, Aslund et al. 3 studied the safety of FT control systems using fault-tree analysis (FTA) and evaluated the impact of diagnosis performances on the system's safety. Weber et al. 8 presented an approach to improve the decision making in fault diagnosis by taking into account a priori knowledge of the system/components' reliability. Weber et al. 9 proposed a new approach to manage actuator redundancy in the presence of faults based on reliability indicators to preserve the health of the actuators and the availability of the system both in the nominal and faulty states. Maza et al. 10 considered the reliability factor of actuators to evaluate the redefined reliability factor of automated systems. This reliability has been expressed in terms of probability not loosing the structural property of controllability for linear systems. Gran et al. 11 proposed an approach for model-based risk assessment to assess different dependability factors in critical systems involving digital instrumentation and control subsystems. Ghostine et al. 12 proposed a framework for the dependability evaluation of networked control systems, which takes into account the network's behavior and faults. Maza 4 proposed an integrated modeling approach based on SANs, to make systematic construction of SAN models for FT systems. This approach allows the modeling of dynamic and stochastic behaviors and explicitly includes the diagnosis performances. This approach considered repairable systems and studied, using MC simulations, their mean availability with respect to the diagnosis performance rates. This article extends this approach to unrepairable systems to make a more complete dependability analysis by considering other performance measures such as the reliability/ safety factor for unrepairable systems and the maintenance costs for repairable systems. Indeed, FT procedures are implemented in many unrepairable systems where the reliability/safety is highly sought, such as safety and transportation systems, for which the reliability factor is of interest. 13 For repairable systems, the actual tendency for maintenance methodologies is to consider more and more information provided from diagnosis and prognostic procedures and system's data to plan inspection/replacement/maintenance actions. 2 This article also considers the modeling of monitoringbased maintenance and offers a way to study not only the impact of diagnosis performances on the system's availability but also the maintenance cost. The cost entailed by maintenance operations is an important criterion not to be neglected when planning maintenance operations.
The SAN formalism
One can find a large variety of methods and tools in the literature to make the dependability analysis and assessment. 14 Some are static such as reliability block diagrams (RBDs) and FTA. Others are dynamic and allow the modeling of system's states and dynamic behavior such as Markov processes, Petri nets (PNs), SANs and MC simulation. This article deals with the SANs and proposes to use them in an integrated modeling approach to model and analyze FT systems.
SANs are discrete-event system modeling formalism. They are able to model stochastic phenomena and are very similar to the generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN). For the sake of simplicity and since the GSPNs are well known than SANs, their formal definition is given in the following. Then, additional SAN features will be explained in comparison to GSPNs.
A stochastic Petri net (SPN) is a directed bipartite graph, defined by the six-tuple SPN = (P, T, I, O, M 0 , L). Here T and P are two distinct sets of vertexes. T = {T1, ., Tn} is a set of transitions and P = {P1, P2, ., Pm} is a set of places. I & PxT is the set of input arcs, and O & TxP is the set of output arcs. M 0 is the initial marking vector, M 0 = (M 0 (p 1 ), M 0 (p 2 ), . . . , M 0 (p m )) T , where M 0 (P i ) is the initial number of tokens of place P i . L = (l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l n ) is a vector of a possibly marking-dependent firing rate associated with transitions. 15 A GSPN is an SPN in which some transitions are timed, while others are immediate. Random, exponentially distributed firing delays are associated with timed transitions. Immediate transitions have priority over timed transitions. The selection among possibly conflicting enabled immediate transitions is made through firing probabilities forming the so-called random switches. 15 The SANs were first introduced by Mogavar and Meyer, 16 to model a wide range of systems to analyze their behavior and make their performance and dependability assessment. Compared to PNs, they are characterized by the following elements: 17
Places: As for PNs, for SANs, places are of two types: ordinary and extended. Extended places are a bit similar to colored places in colored PNs, 18 but tokens are materialized as variables associated with these extended places and cannot be removed or added like colored PNs. Thus, the marking of an extended place is not its number of tokens, but the value of its associated variable which can be of any type: array, matrix or a data structure. This value can be red or changed. Extended places do not exist for GSPNs and increase the modeling capabilities of SANs. In Mobı¨us software tool which supports the SAN formalism, ordinary and extended places are represented by blue and orange circles, respectively ( Figure 1 ). Activities: They are equivalent to transitions in PNs. But unlike GSPNs, the timed activities can have either a deterministic or a stochastic duration, and stochastic activities are not necessarily exponentially distributed. An activity may complete (i.e. fire) through many possibilities modeled by the socalled cases probabilities. Cases probabilities: They model the uncertainty about the active or enabled activity to complete. Both timed and immediate activities can have cases probabilities. The latter are graphically represented by small circles on the right side of an activity ( Figure 1 ). These probabilities can be marking dependent, and their sum should be equal to one. Input gates: They are used to control the activation of activities. An input gate defines the condition on the marking of its input places to make the activity enabled as well as their marking changes after the completion of the activity. The input function also allows the modeling of inhibitor arcs. When the input gate is connected to an extended place, it allows the reading of its associated data (i.e. marking). An input gate is modeled by a red triangle. Output gates: They define, thanks to their output function, the marking change on the output places of an activity when it completes. This marking change can be more or less elaborated. When connected to an extended place, they allow the writing over its associated data.
Here, an example of a SAN model is given with all its described elements. In Figure 1 , the timed-activity TA1 has three cases probabilities for three possible completions of TA1. The instantaneous activity I1 has input and output gates (InpG1 and OutG1, respectively). The input gate has two input places: an ordinary place (Place2) and an extended one (ExtP1). The latter could not be connected directly to an activity, but only to its input and output gates. If ExtP1 is associated with a float variable, x, then the latter can be written as x = M(ExtP1), where M(ExtP1) is the marking of place ExtP1. The output function of the output gate OutG1 allows to change the value of the variable x (e.g. x = x 2 + 1). However, the input function of InpG1 allows defining the condition on the marking of its input places to enable the activity I1 (e.g. x5M(Place2) 2 ). Such features are not available on classical GSPNs. Extended places will be used later to evaluate some performance amounts such as maintenance costs.
FT systems
Fault tolerance is the property that enables a system to continue operating properly in the event of failure/fault of its components. Fault tolerance is particularly sought after in high-availability or life-critical systems.
To achieve FT systems, many subsystems and functionalities are added to the nominal system to reduce the impact of perturbations on the system's behavior and performances ( Figure 2 ). The main FT-system functionalities are briefly explained in the following.
The FDI function
The diagnosis or FDI feature is a key function in FT systems. Indeed, the diagnosis system allows the detection of failure occurrence on the system's components as well as their localization. This is essential to undertake some recovery actions such as reconfiguration and maintenance ( Figure 2 ).
There are many procedures to perform fault diagnosis, 13 and one common way is to use a fault-free model of the system, like its observer, to calculate some system's variables when it is not faulty. These variables are compared to the real ones, measured on the real system. The difference between these variables is called the residual r. Since the systems are generally operating in noisy environments, the residual is compared to some threshold J to make decision: an alarm will be produced if r . J. According to the value of threshold parameter and to the fault nature, a fault may be detected correctly (D) or missed detected (MD). Also, an alarm may be produced while there is no fault and this is called a false alarm (FA). The probabilities of MD and FA can be seen as a measure of diagnosis performances and have an impact on the actions to be undertaken. Thus, they should be considered in the FT system's dependability analysis problem. 4
The reconfiguration function
This function allows the reconfiguration of either the material architecture of the system or the control policy when an alarm is produced by the diagnosis procedure. Material reconfiguration is possible by employing secondary components, called backups, used in redundancy with the main components of the nominal system. When an alarm is produced by the supervisor, the system is reconfigured by switching from the supposedly faulty component to its backup. There are several material redundancy policies. This article considers two redundancy types: hot active redundancy (i.e. redundant components are fully activated) and cold passive redundancy (i.e. redundant components are completely switched off).
When the system is automated, the controller may be designed to be robust to some faults. Also, many control laws can be established to deal with some faults. In this case, in the presence of a fault, the system may switch from one control law to another one to minimize the fault's effect. This is known as FT control. 13 
The maintenance function
Maintenance is all the actions necessary for retaining an item or restoring it to a specified condition. 14 It can be mainly classified into two major classes:
Preventive maintenance: It is carried out to prevent an item failing or wearing out by providing systematic inspection, detection and prevention of incipient failure. It aims at preserving the useful life of equipment.
Corrective maintenance: It is required when an item has failed, in order to bring it back to working order. This activity may consist of repair, restoration or equipment replacement. It can be the result of regular inspection or an effective FDI. Thus, it is tightly related to diagnosis procedure's decisions. 4 When an alarm is produced and the system switches from the assumed faulty component to its backup, a maintenance action could be undertaken on it. This allows, for example, to switch back by reconfiguration to the main component and to improve the system's dependability.
SAN-based modeling for performance analysis of an FT system
The integrated SAN-modeling approach proposed in Maza 4 is recalled and explained below on an application example. It takes into account explicitly the diagnosis performances, redundancy policies and maintenance actions on the supervised components. Some extensions of it will be proposed to make possible the assessment of other performance factors such as reliability and maintenance costs. Simulation results and analysis of this example will be given in section ''Simulation study and results.''
Description of the studied process
Let us consider a tank for heating and controlling the flow of a liquid (Figure 3 ). It gets at its entry a liquid characterized by a flow rate Q e and a temperature T e . The electric power P(t) delivered by two resistors R 1 and R 2 is used for heating the liquid. One controller acts on the resistors to control the liquid temperature T o , while the other acts on the valve to maintain the output flow Q o constant. Three sensors are used: SensorT to measure the temperature, SensorF to measure the flow rate and SensorH to measure the height. The latter can be used to compute the flow. Thus, the flow and height sensors are considered to be in redundancy, and the controller can use both of them. SensorF is monitored by a diagnosis system to allow reconfiguration to SensorH when an alarm occurs.
Description of the process' SAN modeling
The considered process has two main functions: flow control and temperature control. To derive its SAN model, a functional analysis according to these two main functions has been conducted together with the failure analysis as in Maza. 4 The basic idea of this analysis is to consider that a control function is lost if the controllers, sensors or actuators failed (Figure 4 ). This study focuses on the flow loop control part since it 
includes the fault-tolerance functions described in section ''FT systems.''
This process is used to illustrate the main modeling steps introduced in Maza. 4 This modeling approach is modular and generic, which makes it easily transferable to any other system.
Components modeling
Each physical component C j of the system can be modeled by two places: fC j Ok, C j Kog where a token on a place C j Ok (respectively C j Ko) means the component C j is up (respectively failed). The marking of these places satisfies the inequality M(C j Ok) + M(C j Ko)41 since the component C j is in one of these two states. Note that if M(C j Ok) + M(C j Ko) = 0, the component is down but the token in place C j Ko has been consumed to validate another activity modeling, a logical relationship as explained in section ''Fault-tolerance functions' modeling.'' For the studied process, for example, the flow sensor component, SensorF, is modeled by two places SensorF_Ok and SensorF_Ko related by a timed-activity Fail_SF, the duration of which follows exponential distribution with parameter l SensorF . l SensorF is the failure rate of the sensor. The other process' components are modeled in the exact same way.
A difference is to be noted for backup components, the modeling of which, especially places' initial marking, depends on the redundancy policy. For this studied process, the initial marking of place SensorH_Ok depends on how the backup sensor SensorH is used: M 0 (SensorH Ok) = 0 for cold passive redundancy and M 0 (SensorH Ok) = 1 for hot active redundancy.
Fault-tolerance functions' modeling
The diagnosis function is considered explicitly in terms of its performances: probability of good detection (D), FA and missed detection (MD). According to Maza, 4 it can be modeled as a three-event generator: D, FA and MD.
Knowing the probability of each P D , P FA and P MD , the diagnosis system can be modeled by four places: place Diagnosis which has an initial marking of one and places D, FA and MD modeling the events of the same name. When an alarm is produced, it is a correct one (token in place D) or a false one (token in place FA). Also, an alarm may or may not exist (token in place MD). Consequently, the places D, FA and Place MD enables the activity SF_Ko which adds a token in place FlowM_Ko to model the flow measurement's failure (Figure 4) .
The maintenance action can be applied on the supervised component and the whole system. The maintenance of the flow sensor SensorF is modeled by place Maint_SF and its output timed-activity Repair (Figure 4 ). Since a token on place D or place FA models the diagnosis alarm (correct or false), place D (respectively FA) will enable the activity Maint_C (respectively Maint_P) to add a token on place Maint_SF to start maintenance action. Thereby, activity Maint_C models a corrective maintenance action request, while activity Maint_P models a preventive maintenance action. The latter may be a simple inspection operation since the alarm is false and the supervised component is ok.
The input gate Reset is used to prevent SensorF from failing (completion of activity Fail_SF) when turned off for maintenance purpose.
The maintenance of the whole system is modeled, thanks to the timed-activity Maintenance. Output gate OG1 allows to add a token to all its output places modeling components' up state which are empty. This means all the failed components are restored and available again.
Material reconfiguration is considered here and consists in switching from one component (here the flow sensor) to its backup. It is supposed instantaneous and made with certainty. As explained in subsection ''Components modeling,'' if the backup sensor (SensorH) is used in passive redundancy, then place SensorH_Ok must have a null initial marking and should be connected to activities Maint_C and Maint_P (Figure 4) . These activities will provide it with token when an alarm occurs, and the supervised sensor is turned off for maintenance. When active redundancy is employed, place SensorH_Ok will not be connected to these activities and will have an initial token. The instantaneous activity FandH has two input places: Laint_SF and SensorH_Ko which model the fact that the main sensor is turned-off for maintenance and that its backup is failed. Activity FandH will add a token on place FlowM_Ko modeling the loss of the flow-measurement function. Note that this activity plays the role of an AND logic operator (Figure 4) . Indeed, when the simultaneous failure of many components is necessary to lose the system's function, an activity with many input places (modeling the components' failures) represents adequately this situation (like activity FandH). The OR logic operator can be represented by several independent activities (i.e. the failure of one component is sufficient to get the system down) as explained in the following. The whole system failed (place System_Ko) if the temperature or the flow control system failed (activities Temp or Flow, respectively). The flow control part failed (place Flow_Ctrl_Ko) if the actuators or the controllers or the sensors failed. This is modeled by the independent activities VC 1 , VC 2 and VC 3 , respectively.
Performance factor modeling
The maintenance costs are calculated, thanks to two extended places Cost1 and Cost2. Cost1 is associated with a two-dimensional array, X, to compute the cost induced by a maintenance action on the supervised sensor. The costs of the sensor's preventive and corrective maintenance actions are computed and stored in the vector's components X(1) and X(2), respectively. Each time the activity Maint_P (respectively Maint_C) completes, the cost X(1) (respectively X(2)) is calculated according to X(1) = X(1) + T p *C P (respectively X(2) = X(2) + T c *C c )), thanks to the output gate OG2 (respectively OG3). C p and C c are time-unit costs for preventive and corrective maintenance of the sensor, respectively. T p and T c are the sensor's repair duration for preventive and corrective maintenance actions, respectively. These time durations can be constant or randomly generated and affected to the timedactivity Repair. In the last case, Cost1 should then define a four-dimensional array, X, where X(3) = T c and X(4) = T p . The input gate IG2 allows the reading of these quantities (i.e. X(3) and X(4)) and to affect them to the timed-activity Repair.
The output gate OG4 resets the variables X(3) and X(4) to zero, when the maintenance action is finished (completion of activity Repair).
The exact same reasoning can be applied to place Cost2 affected to the variable y denoting the cost of a global maintenance on the system. The output gate OG1 computes this cost according to y = y + T T *C T , where T T denotes the repair time of the whole system and C T is the time-unit repair cost (with C T . C p and C T . C c ). Indeed, the loss of the whole system's function and the maintenance of the latter are much more costly than losing and maintaining only one component.
The availability factor can be assessed on the model discussed in this section since it considers that the system is repairable. This factor can be assessed by considering the marking of the place System_Ko. If it is null, then the system is available.
The reliability factor assessment can be done by deleting the activity Maintenance and all its input and output arcs. Consequently, place System_Ko becomes an absorbing place. As for the availability, the system's reliability is computed according to the marking of this place as explained in the next section.
Simulation study and results
This modeling approach is combined with MC simulation to assess some performance amounts. A SAN model will be executed multiple times using different randomly generated event streams to generate different trajectories or histories through the system's event space. Many histories must be generated to get statistically significant estimations. 4 All the SAN models are developed using Mobı¨us software tool. The simulation's stopping criterion can be either the number of simulated histories, N h , or the desired confidence level. The latter specifies the desired probability that the exact value of the measured variable will be within the specified interval around the variable estimate.
In this study, the minimum and maximum numbers of simulated histories are 5 3 10 4 and 8 3 10 5 , respectively. Simulations are stopped if 95% of the results are contained within an interval of 5% around their mean value. The components' failure rates and the parameters of the timed activities are given in Table 1 .
Parameters A 1 and B 1 (respectively A 2 and B 2 ) are used for the timed-activity Repair (respectively Maintenance). The activity Maintenance does not exist in the reliability evaluation model (section ''Performance factor modeling.'')
The MC simulations are driven for different diagnosis performance factors to show their impact on the overall performances factors such as reliability, availability and maintenance cost.
All the simulations of this article run for only few seconds on an Intel Ò Core ä Duo central processing unit (CPU) with a clock speed of 2.26 GHz. One of the advantages of the proposed approach is its polynomial algorithmic complexity, which makes it more attractive over some modeling approaches based on automata, for example. Indeed, one can see that each physical component, monitoring and maintenance actions are each modeled by a specific atomic SAN model, and atomic models are connected to each other through some logic operators. This makes the total number of places and activities proportional to the system's number of components and features.
Reliability factor assessment
Four SAN models (R k , k = 1, 4) have been designed using the procedure described in section ''SAN-based modeling for performance analysis of an FT system'' to study the impact of fault-tolerance functions (i.e. diagnosis performances, maintenance and redundancy policies) on the whole system's reliability factor. The models R 1 and R 2 represent cold passive redundancy of the backup sensor. The maintenance action on the supervised sensor, SensorF, is done in model R 1 but not in R 2 . The models R 3 and R 4 consider hot active redundancy of the backup sensor. SensorF is maintained in
For N h simulated histories, let N ok (t) be the number of times that the place System_Ko got an empty marking at instant of time t. Then, the system's reliability at time t, called R(t), is computed as
According to simulation results ( Figure 5 ), when the fault detection is made with certainty (P D = 100%), the model R 1 (i.e. where SensorF is maintained and reconfigured to its passive backup SensorH) is the one which gives the best system reliability. This shows the impact of the maintenance and redundancy policies. The worst reliability is obtained for model R 4 , where no recovery actions are undertaken. The system's reliability for model R 2 is quite similar to one of the models, R 3 , but better. This tendency changes when the diagnosis system is not perfect. Indeed, when P FA = 10% and P D = 80%, model R 3 (i.e. with active redundancy) gives a better reliability than R 2 and R 4 ( Figure 6 ). The reliability of model R 2 is getting worse than before. This can be explained by the fact that for model R 2 , FAs make the system reconfigure from monitored sensor to its backup while it is not allowed to fail. This makes the whole system more endangered to failures than when the two sensors are both used like for model R3. In fact, model R 2 is more sensitive to the diagnosis performances than model R 3 because of the employed redundancy.
For all models R k (k = 1, 4), note that the system's reliability is better when the detection is made with certainty (i.e. P D = 100%). For example, at t = 400 t.u. and when P D = 100%, the system's reliability is of 0.614 for model R 1 and of 0.27 for model R 2 . When P FA = 10%, it decreases to 0.57 for R 1 and 0.09 for R 2 .
Maintenance cost assessment
Three SAN models are designed to make this study:
P&M model: The supervised sensor, SensorF, is maintained when an alarm is produced and its backup, SensorH, is in passive redundancy (Figure 4 ). The time-unit cost for the supervised sensor's repair is C c = 0.75 for a corrective maintenance and C p = 0.1 for a preventive maintenance. While the time-unit cost affected to the corrective maintenance of the whole system is C T = 3. The history duration is fixed to T h = 20,000 t.u.
The total maintenance cost is calculated as the sum of the two extended places Cost1 and Cost2 markings and is made for various FA rates (Figure 7) . Note that the case where P FA = 0, the detection is made with certainty (i.e. P D = 100% and P MD = 0). Figure 6 . The time evolution of the FT-system reliability when the diagnosis is not perfect (P FA = 10% and P D = 80%) for the simulation models R k , k = 1, 4.
From the results of Figure 7 , it can be seen that the total cost for model ''P&NM'' is approximately stable when the FA rate increases, unlike the model ''P&M.'' For the latter, the total maintenance cost increases with the FA rate which is predictable since the supervised sensor is maintained each time a FA occurs. Figure 8 shows the contribution of the preventive maintenance action to the total maintenance cost. Indeed, the preventive maintenance cost is proportional to the total number of times SensorF is maintained, which increases with the FA rate. It also shows how the sensor's corrective maintenance cost decreases in favor of its preventive maintenance cost when the FA rate increases. Indeed, SensorF is not able to effectively fail since it is constantly maintained. From Figure 7 , despite the fact that the maintenance cost increases with the FA rate, it can be observed that for the model ''P&M'', it remains less important than for models ''P&NM'' and ''NoDiag''. This can be explained by the fact that for model ''P&M,'' the system's mean availability is the best one ( Figure 9 ).
It can be seen that from P FA = 1% and higher, the system's availability of model ''P&NM'' is worse than the case where no diagnosis function is applied (i.e. model ''NoDiag''). This explains why the total maintenance cost is also higher. This means that with such diagnosis performances and system's parameters, it is better not to implement a diagnosis procedure which alarms excessively without improving the system's availability while increasing the system's maintenance cost.
All the simulation results of this section show that the usually made hypothesis about perfect fault detection (i.e. P D = 100%) is too optimistic since it always gives the best results.
Conclusion
This article proposes an integrated modeling approach based on SANs to model FT systems and study the impact of some of its fault-tolerance features on the system's performances. This modeling approach is combined with MC simulation to assess some RAMS factors such as the reliability, availability and the cost of the maintenance activity.
According to the diagnosis decisions, various faulttolerance actions can be made to cover the faults such as the material reconfiguration and components repairing/replacement. All these functions interact with each other to make the whole system more dependable. The question one can ask is about the efficiency of these functions and their real impact on the system's performances: Is the dependability really increased? If yes, by how much?
This article shows the necessity of an integrated modeling approach to make such an analysis. It proposes a simulation study to show how some dependability and performance factors of the FT system behave according to the diagnosis performances, maintenance and redundancy policies. The simulation studies show that the obtained performances are tightly related to the fault-tolerance features and the system's parameters.
The advantage of the proposed approach and its modeling formalism is the algorithmic complexity with respect to the system's size in comparison with other approaches and formalisms.
One perspective of this work is to consider the modeling of more complex reconfiguration policies, control laws and diagnosis tuning parameters and to study their impact on the system's dependability factors.
